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Security experts agree that although unlikely, a nuclear terrorist attack is possible. 
Concerted efforts are needed in order to secure nuclear materials and nuclear 
weapons around the globe, particularly from ‘countries of concern’, in order to 
prevent their use by terrorist organisations. In this context, the US has a prime role 
to play as it may provide technical and logistical assistance to countries that are at 
risk of becoming the unwilling suppliers of fissile material to terrorist organisations. 
This article examines the possibilities of collaboration between the US and Pakistan 
in relation to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. 
 
Since 1945 the world has been confronted with three major fears associated with the existence 
and possible use of nuclear weapons: a potential clash of superpowers during the Cold War 
era; the political and military peril of nuclear proliferation; and the threat of catastrophic 
nuclear accidents. Derived from the attacks of 9/11, the latest nuclear anxiety is the danger 
that sub-state groups will integrate nuclear terrorism into their strategic repertoire by getting 
hold of unsafe fissile materials or ready-made, black-marketed nuclear weapons [1].  
Just like the nuclear countries, terrorists see the ‘ultimate destructive power’ [2] of nuclear 
weapons as an instrument for the attainment of their goals. Nuclear weapons are, in this sense, 
a realistic strategic option that these groups may recur to in order to push the US and its 
partners to accede to their demands which can range from the withdrawal of US support for 
Israel, the annexation of Kashmir by Pakistan, or the creation of Islamic governance systems 
(Shariah) around the world [3]. 
William C. Potter of the Center for Non proliferation Studies and Charles D. Ferguson 
argue that a nuclear terrorist attack is more likely to happen now than in any other time in the 
past. The rationale behind this statement lies in two basic premises [4]: 
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1. Non-state actors have emerged in the form of terrorist networks/organisations, 
which have the urge to use nuclear weapons for furthering their agendas. 
2. Crude but real nuclear weapons, as distinct from radiological dispersal devices, are 
well within the technical reach of some terrorist organisations.  
 
It is due to these realistic and almost tangible threats that nuclear non-proliferation has become 
‘the pre-eminent national security issue for the US’. The most prominent policy goal of the US 
is therefore to keep nuclear weapons, the know-how required for their construction, and the 
fissile materials that make them dangerous, out of the hands of those who could inflict harm 
on the country or one of its allies [5]. Thus, the current US strategy of non-proliferation with 
regards to the terrorist threat could be categorised along the following dimensions:  
 
1. Securing nuclear materials and warheads at the sites where they are stored, a matter 
that could be termed the ‘first line of defence’. [6] 
2. Reducing the risk of proliferation or even of nuclear confrontations in South and 
Central Asia. [7]  
3. Securing vulnerable Russian nuclear weapons. [8] 
4. Improving protection of nuclear facilities within the US. [9] 
5. Improving border and cargo monitoring at the frontier crossings and embarkation 
points most likely to be used by smugglers. [10] 
6. Containing the spread of nuclear intelligence, defined as the know-how and material 
elements required to build a nuclear explosive device or even more cursory (yet 
sensitive) information that could give some group access to ready-made nuclear 
weapons. [11]  
7. Preventing more states from acquiring nuclear weapons. [12] 
 
Graham T. Allison has shown, in this sense, the inevitability of nuclear terrorism, arguing 
that this activity could pick up pace during the next decade. In order to prevent such 
inevitability, Allison has suggested that the ‘thousands of unsecured weapons (soft ball size 
lumps of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium) in Russia should be guarded 
from being stolen by criminals who could then sell them to terrorists deriving great economic 
gains’ [13]. 
The US has forged a network of alliances with many countries as a measure to ward off 
terrorism after the attacks of 9/11. In this respect, the basic strategic goal of the US is to deploy 
a policy which makes ‘prevention the highest priority’ in ‘countries of concern’ [14]. North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Russia could be labeled as ‘countries of concern’ because of 
their undemocratic governments, the anti-Americanism that exists in some subgroups of their 
societies, and the existence of unsecured nuclear weapons or fissile materials which are 
vulnerable to thefts and may be diverted for their use in nuclear terrorist attacks. The focus of 
this paper will be limited to the case of Pakistan, a strong partner of the US in its ‘war against 
terrorism’, that nevertheless poses, due to its unstable situation and precarious socioeconomic 
structure, a high risk of being the source of black-marketed nuclear weapons and/or fissile 
materials. This paper will delve into the current US strategic cooperative efforts towards 
Pakistan in order to assess and fill any gaps that might exist in a foreign policy approach based 
on the US’s ‘first line of defence’ rationale.  
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Defining nuclear terrorism 
Nuclear terrorism is a term that is not restricted solely to the use by a terrorist organisation of 
an explosive nuclear device. According to Ferguson, nuclear terrorism in its broad definition 
includes actions such as [15] 
 
• The seizure and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon. 
• The theft or purchase of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, leading to 
the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon, or an improvised nuclear 
device (IND). 
• Attacks against, and sabotage of, nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants, to 
try to cause the release of large amounts of radioactivity. 
• The unauthorised acquisition of radioactive materials contributing to the 
construction and detonation of a radiological dispersion device, popularly known as 
a ‘dirty bomb,’ or a radiation emission device. 
 
Nuclear terrorism involving the detonation of an (albeit primitive) nuclear device is not to 
be deemed a technically unachievable scenario. The simplicity of a gun-type weapon design 
makes it easier for a terrorist, given access to HEU, to engage in nuclear terrorism. A terrorist 
group could use, for instance, a commercial explosive to shoot two sub-critical masses of HEU 
into one another to ‘form [the] supercritical mass needed to sustain an explosive chain 
reaction’ [16]. Plutonium could likewise be used as a fissile element, though it implies a greater 
deal of technical challenges. Plutonium would have to be employed in the more technically 
sophisticated implosion-assembly method, which uses military-grade explosives and precision 
detonation electronics to squeeze the plutonium into a supercritical mass. 
Al-Qaeda and the inevitability of nuclear terrorism 
The probability of a nuclear terrorist attack has increased in the aftermath of 9/11. Security 
experts agree that although unlikely, a nuclear terrorist attack is possible. Several episodes in 
the contemporary history of nuclear proliferation unveil, in particular, al-Qaeda’s clandestine 
efforts to get the bomb. As early as December 1998, Bin Laden showed great desires to acquire 
nuclear weapons for the mass killing of so-called ‘infidels’. Bin Laden believes, it is said, that it 
is a religious duty to possess nuclear weapons and that were he not to follow this duty, he 
would be committing a sin [17]. Bin Laden tried to acquire nuclear materials as far back as in 
1992 when he sought to forge relations with South Africa. Bin Laden was also alleged to have 
sought a deal with Chechen rebels in Russia to buy a nuclear war head [18]. 
The fact that, until now, Bin Laden’s network has not recurred to a nuclear attack does 
not mean that such attack will not occur. Evidence shows that there is an important probability 
of a large-scale terrorist attack involving the use of nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of 9/11, 
Osama Bin Laden was reported to have said in an interview with the Pakistani news paper 
Dawn that if the US uses nuclear weapons on Osama Bin Laden groups and affiliates, he would 
attack the US with nuclear and/or chemical/biological weapons. In the same interview, Bin 
Laden also assured that he possessed weapons of mass destruction [19]. 
The statements issued by al-Qaeda before and after the 9/11 attacks are evidence of the 
intense hatred this network holds towards Americans. Graham Allison argues, in this sense, 
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that al-Qaeda would not miss any chance to kill and injure millions of Americans, since they 
believe that America’s collaboration with ‘the Jewish’ ‘is the cause of corruption and is 
responsible for the breakdown of values: moral, ideological, political and economic’. The poor 
state of Muslims in the contemporary world, according to their view, is due to America [20]. 
The document Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects produced in 2003 reports, for instance, that 
Islamist extremists linked to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden ‘have a wide variety of potential 
agents and delivery means to choose from for chemical, biological and radiological or nuclear 
(CBRN) attacks.’ The goal of these terrorists would thus be to use CBRN to cause mass 
causalities. ‘Attacks would be small scale, incorporating relatively crude delivery means and 
easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins or radiological substances’ [21]. 
 However, many analysts and policy makers have argued that nuclear terrorism is not 
inevitable. Robin Frost argues that obtaining access to fissile material and consequently assem-
bling an explosive device would prove to be a very difficult for a terrorist organisation. Frost 
does not limit the definition of terrorist organisations to al-Qaeda; he includes many other 
such organisations. These organisations draw their motivations from multifarious political, 
spiritual and historical events, like Aum Shinriko in Japan, the National Liberation Front of 
Nigeria, the Irish Republic Army, and other separatist organisations who could find ‘hostage-
taking, conventional bombings, shoot and run sniper attacks more feasible and cheaper to 
attain their terrorist motivations’ [22]. 
Despite these criticisms, the sheer danger posed by the possibility of a nuclear-armed al-
Qaeda makes focus on this organisation highly relevant. Even Frost has contended that al-
Qaeda stands today as the most dangerous religious terrorist organisation [23]. Frost even 
concedes that al-Qaeda has attempted to acquire a nuclear weapon and is obsessed with killing 
American citizens.  
Similarly, I argue that al-Qaeda believes in nuclear terrorism as an instrument that will 
allow this organisation to fulfil its goals (in particular, the assassination of Americans). Osama 
Bin Laden, leader of al-Qaeda, runs this organisation on the core beliefs of extremist political 
Islam, making it easier for these Sunni fundamentalists to renounce to their lives in the process 
of killing the ‘infidels’ in this world. After all, this belief contends, martyrs will be rewarded 
with 72 wives and a mansion of gold in the afterlife which, incidentally, is more important than 
earthly existence [24]. For Bin Laden and his followers, praying, marrying twelve wives, living 
in caves, crossing the snow-clad mountains of northern Kashmir and Afghanistan without the 
basic amenities of survival, fasting in Ramadan, or killing ‘infidels’ are all on the same level, all 
mere acts to make Allah content. The force of Imaan (belief in Arabic) could make them do 
anything. These extremist individuals, whether from Hizbollah or Jaish-e Mohammed, draw 
their motivations from the battles fought between Prophet Mohammed and the Jews of 
Medina in the 600 AD Battle of Badr, where Muslims were a small minority but overwhelmed 
their opponents. The battle of Karbala is also a mythical figure in the minds of Sunni 
fundamentalist terrorist groups, and although a defeat for Husyn, grandson of Prophet 
Mohammed, it is seen with reverence, extreme passion and devotion. Moreover, due to their 
beliefs in a Muslim brotherhood (based on the fear of Allah and giving one’s life while 
pursuing jehad for saving Allah’s religion), al-Qaeda deems it reasonable to use any means 
available, whether it be nuclear weapons or aeroplanes and buildings, for spreading Islam and 
killing the western ‘Satan’, i.e. the US [25]. 
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Bin Laden wants to bring the ‘rule of Allah’ to the world, and is not inspired by any ‘cult’ 
or driven by the need to make his ‘personality special or gifted’ [26]. Bin Laden said in one of 
his sermons [27]: 
 
All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war 
on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. And Ulema have throughout Islamic history 
unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the 
Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in Al-Mughni, Imam al-
Kisa’i in Al-Bada’i, al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the Shaykh of al-Islam in his 
books, where he said: ‘As for the fighting to repulse [an enemy], it is aimed at 
defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by the ulema]. Nothing is 
more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is attacking religion and life’.  
 
The above mentioned evidence makes it clear that al-Qaeda is adamant to engage in nuclear 
terrorism.  
Deterrence and nuclear terrorism 
The traditional strategy that was used between states to prevent either the spread of nuclear 
weapons or their first use was that of deterrence. This concept, however, may fail in its 
applicability once it is extended to the domain of nuclear terrorism due to the mere fact that 
sub-state actors do not respond in the same way as a nation or a centralised bureaucratic 
system. Thus, in the literature, arguments have been made both for and against deterrence as a 
line of defence against nuclear terrorism. 
The main position in the literature argues that deterrence, defined as threatening an enemy 
with assured destruction, cannot work effectively against non-state actors, i.e. the terrorists. 
Deterrence, in this view, is only viable for enemies having a territorial reality [28].  
However, Micheal A. Levi [29] argues that ‘with a little technological innovation, deter-
rence can become a useful strategy against terrorist use of nuclear weapons’. Given that nuclear 
terrorism depends on the existence of a state-based source of either active weapons or basic 
fissile materials, deterrence could work under the guarantee of massive retaliation against 
countries involved in the promotion and/or sponsorship of terrorism: ‘those rogue states who 
are caught secretly or overtly providing nuclear materials and weapons to terrorists’ and who 
could consequently be threatened with complete nuclear retaliation in the form of a inter-state 
confrontation (although the legality of this issue is left open to questioning). Levi thus argue 
that  
 
[B]uilding on scientific techniques developed during the Cold War, the United States 
stands a good chance of developing the tools needed to attribute terrorist nuclear 
attacks to their state sponsors. If it can put those tools in place and let its enemies 
know of their existence, deterrence could become one of the most valuable tools in 
the war on terror.  
 
I concur with Levi, insofar as deterrence can be used as a measure against nuclear terrorism. 
Once the links of the rogue states with terrorists are unveiled, massive retaliation could be used 
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destroy such links: focus should be on breaking the links of terrorist with any states/non state 
actors transferring fissile material. 
The US and Pakistan 
The history of the US-Pakistan relationship is chequered. Sometimes Pakistan has been the US’s 
most favoured ally and sometimes a troublesome friend. Now, Pakistan represents three things 
to the US; ‘a staunch ally’, ‘a threat’ and a ‘troublesome friend’. 
For instance, Pakistan is termed as the most favoured non-NATO ally by the US (specifi-
cally by the administration of President George W. Bush and in reference to its role in the war 
against nuclear terrorism.) This position has been cemented by the work of Pervez Musharraf, 
President of Pakistan; he is often referred to by anti-American elements within the country as 
‘Busharf’ due to his strong pro-American leanings [30]. On the other hand, after the A. Q. 
Khan nuclear black market network was exposed in 2004, Pakistan also came to symbolise a 
‘hub of terrorists’, remaining as a great concern for the international community. The doubtful 
ability to secure loose nuclear materials in Pakistan is, in this sense, one of the sources of 
anxiety. In particular, there is a fear that followers of al-Qaeda holding major posts in the 
Pakistani army and the Inter Services Intelligence Agencies might choose to divert nuclear 
weapons to their parent organisation [31].  
President Musharraf has reiterated that nuclear command and control in Pakistan is 
securely delegated and that nuclear materials are secure and protected from terrorist elements. 
However, it has been argued that this false ‘expressed belief’ of Musharraf poses a major 
problem in securing nuclear material from the twisted ideologies of terrorists [32].  
 Nuclear command and control in Pakistan 
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Systems (C3I) are the arrangements of 
facilities, personnel, procedures and means of information acquisition, processing and dissemi-
nation used by a commander in planning, directing and controlling military operations [33]. 
Safe and reliable C3I systems are thus a prerequisite in preventing access to nuclear materials. 
There are many features of the existing Command and Control (CC) system in Pakistan 
which deviate from the typical US-USSR model. Pakistani policy makers contend that ‘the issues 
relating to the nuclear [CC] in the Indo-Pakistani context are different in nature from those of 
the Cold War Model. The geographical proximity of the two countries, the asymmetry in 
conventional forces, and the low strategic warning times are factors that demand highly 
efficient and reliable CC executed by their respective decision making authorities. The absolute 
failsafe CC is not likely to be achieved by either side in near future; indeed, such an ideal was 
perhaps not even achieved by the US or the USSR. Thus, an ‘always/never’ dilemma will 
continue to be part of the risk calculus for accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons 
on both sides’ [34]. 
Khalid Banuri of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division elaborates that ‘Pakistan has 
established an effective and reliable National Command Authority (NCA) that is at the apex of 
a decision-making body under the chairmanship of the President, with the Prime Minister as its 
Vice-Chairman.’ This system consists of an Employment Control Committee and 
Development Control Committee as well as of a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) which acts as 
its Secretariat, and a Strategic Force Commands with clearly defined functions. The operational 
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control of all strategic assets in Pakistan rests directly with the NCA through the SPD which has, 
on ground, a very elaborate and layered security structure under a Director General Security, 
reporting directly to the Director of SPD [35]. 
Pakistan has also taken steps towards the evolution of its export-control legislation, now 
approved by the Cabinet and under revision within the Parliament. This legislation lays down 
strict export-control measures and will take stringent actions for any attempt or violation of 
export-control laws. 
Pakistan furthermore has a rigorous screening for human reliability at various levels of 
access to nuclear materials. Likewise, Pakistan is open to outside assistance, the overarching 
principle being, however, non-intrusiveness [36]. 
In particular, it is Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division which looks after the security of 
nuclear materials and facilities. Other measures taken by Pakistan to secure its nuclear materials 
include: 
 
• The introduction of domestic legislation to tighten controls on nuclear-related 
exports 
• The improvement of physical security at sensitive facilities 
• The strengthening of the personnel reliability system 
• The relocation of nuclear materials and weapons to more secure locations, and 
• The removal of individuals involved in the nuclear black market from their posts 
within the nuclear establishment [37]. 
No to sanctions – yes to economic help  
Ferguson has argued that certain countries who have terrorist cells, like Pakistan, should be 
penalised [38]. However, while refuting Ferguson, Touqir has argued that any kind of 
American sanctions towards Pakistan would not be a good tool to combat terrorism for they 
would have overall debilitating effects [39]. Sanctions would ‘squeeze Pakistan economically, 
giving rise to more extremist elements. Resource-starved sectors such as health care, education 
and correctional services should be stimulated so that more jobs, better education and health 
services are provided to the marginalised populations. In this sense, the focus of attention 
should not be on the sanctioning of a nation-state (i.e. Pakistan), but rather the recognition 
that unemployed youth facing severe economic challenges, for instance, are attracted by 
extremist organisations are therefore candidates to become suicide bombers.  
The US has to forge a policy towards Pakistan which plucks out the root causes of 
terrorism following an approach different from that of sanctions and diplomatic retaliations. 
As in the past, the US should help Pakistan both economically and socially.  
The United States should not suffer from any political myopia while reviewing its 
economic policies towards Pakistan. The US has to commence its anti-terrorist fight by 
educating both the civilian and military populations: an implementation of social and 
educational reforms is essential. In addition, the US should help India and Pakistan to build 
peace and pursue complete disarmament, so that the ambitions of nuclear terrorists are nipped 
at their base [40].  
The US and Pakistan have cooperated with each other to root out the menace of terrorism 
in the past, so actions of this type are not without some sort of precedence. For instance, 
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within the three years that followed the 9/11 attacks, the US gave economic aid to Pakistan in 
the order of $1 billion, and wrote off $1 billion in debt. In June 2003, the US announced it 
would give a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan to be distributed over five years. This aid is 
aimed at assisting the (traditional) economic and security sectors. A framework agreement on 
trade and investment has also been signed between these two countries, including a $1.2 billion 
arms-sales package that includes the sale of P3 Orion aircrafts. The United States has also 
reinstated a military-training programme through which some three hundred officers have 
received instruction at American military institutions since 2001. Pakistan-US relations are not 
limited only to this kind of military intelligence relationship but extend further [41].  
Curtailing anti Americanism 
US economic assistance towards Pakistan could be used to curtail anti-Americanism. The tradi-
tional Pakistani army has been inculcated with doctrines imbedded with a deep hatred for Jews 
and Hindus [42]. A strategic reorientation of the Pakistani army’s thinking is needed to pave 
the way for the evolution of liberal-minded officers who are tilted more towards US interests 
than those of Osama Bin Laden [43].  
Broader reforms in Pakistan are central to combating terrorism of all kinds. For many 
years, political parties and governments used the goad of anti-Americanism to win public 
support and to divert attention away from festering domestic issues. Now the very same anti-
Americanism is being used by extreme Islamists. Both the Pakistani and US governments 
should cooperate to root out hatred towards the US amongst Pakistani civil and political elites 
as well as within the larger population via, for instance, media campaigns and education [44]. 
India-Pakistan rivalry and nuclear security 
The rivalry between India and Pakistan enhances the risk of nuclear material from being 
diverted into terrorist activities. The ‘new peace’ between India and Pakistan could bolster this 
aspect of security in the region, in direct benefit to the US and its allies [45].  
Pakistan’s first-use policy and inferiority in conventional weapons vis à vis India have given 
it strong incentives for the deployment of its nuclear arsenal, raising concerns in the US policy-
making elite, and forcing them to work even harder to provide assistance on detection 
technologies to Pakistan  
So far India and Pakistan have participated in nuclear-threat reduction measures. They 
have signed or acceded to regional cooperative agreements containing disarmament compo-
nents; and have participated in IAEA nuclear safety and security training courses [46]. 
‘Both countries are also required to provide the highest standards of security for fissile 
material under UN Resolution 1540, and as members of the Convention on Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Materials’ [47]. Although India and Pakistan have taken measures to secure their 
nuclear stockpiles, they have done so on their own terms and have not provided concrete 
evidence to the international community that their nuclear storage facilities are not vulnerable. 
Their national sovereignty overwhelms nuclear security measures. Both countries are 
suspicious about any intrusive act of the IAEA. 
The US could encourage Pakistan to become more cooperative and transparent about its 
nuclear programme, without compromising its national interests. Unlike Russia, Pakistan is not 
likely to allow any US nuclear experts or laboratory specialists in its nuclear facilities, even if it 
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were part of an upgrade in security. In the future, Pakistan cannot be expected to dismantle its 
nuclear establishment, ‘closing down facilities and blending down fissile materials’ [48].  
While looking for a cooperative deal with Pakistan, the US should embark on the 
development of a ‘not-so-hyper’ intrusive tool to safeguard fissile material that keeps in view 
Pakistan’s national security interests and sensitivities related to sovereignty [49]. 
The US should pave the way for bilateral dialogue on the possible ‘menu’ of low-intrusive 
tools, for both civilian and military sites where nuclear material is stored, that could be further 
adopted and implemented by Pakistan unilaterally. Other cooperative measures could be as 
follows [50]: 
 
training programs, exchanges of best practices, and steps to strengthen the security 
culture in all nuclear-related institutions. Organisational links, such as lab-to-lab 
relations and scientific exchanges, could also be explored. Dialogue might need to 
begin by addressing the outsider threat (guard training, fences, cameras, equipment, et 
cetera) because the insider threat is more sensitive and touches on broader internal 
issues that will be more difficult to address without a certain level of trust. It may also 
be possible to provide uncontroversial and non intrusive up-to-date technology that is 
not nuclear specific, including surveillance monitoring and physical access controls. 
 
Some more steps proposed in the literature go as follows: 
 
• ensuring that personnel reliability systems are as up-to-date and efficient as possible 
• updating physical security standards at all nuclear facilities and for weapons, weapon 
components and materials, including barriers and perimeters, surveillance, and 
access control techniques 
• strengthening the security of radioactive material held by non-state agencies 
• ensuring effective planning for dealing with emergencies and response procedures 
• ensuring effective control and accounting for weapons, weapon components, and 
materials 
• reviewing the most likely threats and designing protection that ensures a high level 
of security, and 
• discussing stringent export control law implementation. 
 
The 2001 visit by Secretary of State Collin Powel initiated a bilateral dialogue between the 
US and Pakistan to talk about nuclear security. They were called the ‘non intrusive and non 
sensitive expert-level’ discussions. The scope of the discussion extends from ‘export and 
commodity controls to personnel reliability programs, nuclear material protection, control and 
accounting, transportation security, knowledge exchanges, and training’. Progress on these 
dialogues is successful [51].  
PAL assistance to Pakistan under cooperative threat reduction measures 
Permissive Action Links, or PALs, are a technology integrated into nuclear weapons to force 
any potential user to enter an authorisation code before the weapon can be armed. The 
combined features in PAL mean that any group that were able to obtain one of Pakistan’s 
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weapons would encounter great difficulty in arming or using the device. PAL deals with 
securing nuclear weapons and not the underlying nuclear material. Securing nuclear material 
and nuclear weapons are two different things. 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Measures (CTRM), on the other hand, are a cooperative 
assistance program offered by the US to countries like Russia who are signatories of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for securing nuclear materials and arsenal.  
There are various kinds of constraints faced by the US for the application of CTRM in 
Pakistan. For instance, international legal constraints make it difficult for the US to provide any 
kind of technology to Pakistan, which is (in the framework of the NPT) a non-nuclear state. US 
domestic laws have ‘incorporated significant non proliferation requirements’ which also make 
it difficult to cooperate with Pakistan. For instance Atomic Energy Act requires that states 
receiving US original nuclear material should not transfer it to anyone, putting this technology 
under tight security. The act also needs and Agreement of Cooperation before any technology 
is transferred, and currently, the US and Pakistan do not have such an agreement. There are 
also technical limitations for the US to provide nuclear securing technology to Pakistan, namely, 
because of its very secretly guarded nuclear weapons programme. Knowledge about Pakistani 
nuclear weapons is inadequate, posing a technical hurdle for the US since there is great 
uncertainty as to what they would be dealing with. However, it is desirable that the United 
States ‘offer security assistance [to Pakistan] that includes generic physical security procedures, 
unclassified military handbooks, portal control equipment, sophisticated vaults and access 
doors, and personnel reliability programs’ [52]. 
Conclusion 
Al-Qaeda’s core philosophy is to bring mass deaths to Americans and to bring ‘Allah’s rule’ 
around the world. Bin Laden’s network believes they could only be successful if they ‘bring 
death to the US’. This destructive goal requires powerful weapons and nuclear weapons seem a 
viable option to achieve their end. Concerted efforts are needed with the help of the US to 
secure nuclear materials and nuclear weapons around the globe particularly from countries of 
concern, thus denying al-Qaeda any access. Pakistan’s factional infighting within the Pakistani 
Army could put a dangerous question mark over the command and control of Islamabad’s 
nuclear material and weapons. Similarly, a wider civil war in Pakistan could jeopardise the 
safety and security of its fissile material stocks and nuclear installations. A few assassination 
attempts on President Musharraf in 2003 and 2004 are examples of militants trying to oust him 
from the leadership of Pakistan. This reality has added more to the insecurity of Pakistani 
nuclear material. Although the US has cooperated with Pakistan in some quarters for the 
security and safety of nuclear related issues, America’s own domestic laws, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the sensitive nature of Pakistani nuclear arsenal, the India-Pakistan nuclear 
rivalry and the lack of confidence-building measures between these two nations, illiteracy and 
anti-Americanism in Pakistan, remain hurdles preventing the US to forge true cooperation for 
the security of nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan. Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Measures, which are currently applicable to Russia, should be made globally accessible to 
prevent nuclear terrorism at its roots. 
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